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STUDENTS' FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AFTER TINKER: A HALF
FULL GLASS?
JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH*
Nineteen sixty-nine was the year that the United States Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,' recognizing that students have rights in schools. It was
the year that Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS") staged a successful
one-day strike on Columbia University's campus requesting abolishment of
the ROTC program. It was also the year of the famed Woodstock music
festival and of mass demonstrations for racial equality. Nineteen sixty-nine
was a year in which this country was in turmoil. We were engaged in
political strife and in a war with a faceless foreign enemy on the other side
of the world. By 1969, the Civil Rights Act had passed and, shortly,
subsequent legislation would expand the rights of women and other
minority groups.'
Today, our politics have shifted from creating laws which foster civil
rights to law enforcement of a very different kind. In 1994, for example,
' Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Ed.D., Harvard University; J.D., The University of Pennsylvania
School of Law, is an Associate Professor of School Law in the Department of Educational
Administration and Policy Studies. College of Education. Temple University. Philadelphia. Pa.
The author wishes to thank Patricia Ehrensal. graduate assistant and advanced doctoral student,
Temple University, College of Education, and Alfonso Madrid and Susan Seferian. law students,
Temple University School of Law, for their assistance with this research.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988).
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 provides: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of. or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
The Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 states: "No state shall deny equal
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national
origin . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1988). Section (f) of this Act granted equal educational
opportunity to linguistic minorities. Id. § 1073(f. For a thorough discussion of these issues, see
ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW (1986).
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two leading pieces of legislation included an act aimed at making schools
safer3 and a massive crime bill which, among other things, allows for
more police protection.4  Today, we wage another war. This time, the
battleground is not on foreign soil, but on very familiar turf. The war is
in our neighborhoods and in our schools.5 It is a war against drugs and
violence.6 How we have chosen to fight this war' provides important
commentary on the Tinker decision and its progeny, particularly those
decisions discussing students' rights to privacy and to due process under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District'
involved a group of students who wore black armbands to school in protest
of the Vietnam War. The United States Supreme Court overturned a lower
I Safe Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C.A. § 5961 (a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that.
by year 2000, American schools will be drug and violence free), Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101, 7102 (West Supp. 1995) (explaining
Congressional findings that correct widespread illegal use of drugs and alcohol by school age
children is presenting grave threat).
I Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13.701-14,223
(West Supp. 1995). Part of the legislation provides for grants to fund programs with the goal of
reducing the number of violent crimes committed by youths. Id. § 13,862.
1 See, e.g., Ed Anderson. Task Force Targets Drugs, Violence in La. Schools. THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 19. 1994, at A13 (indicating that national polls show drugs and violence in
schools are more worrisome to parents than grades). Arden Moore, Violence Concerns Students;
Guns, Fighting, Drugs Found in Most Schools. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 8. 1995. at 14A (discussing
findings of study mandated by Florida Legislature that one in four students does not feel safe in
school).
6 See, e.g., Carole Feldman, 'Epidemic of Violence' Grips American Schools; Metal
Detectors, Searches of Lockers, Drug-Sniffing Dogs Used to Curb Crime, Nationwide Survey
Shows, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 6. 1994, at 3A (discussing that violence in schools is not just
urban problem but has increased in rural and suburban areas), Leslie Williams, N.O. Schools
Seeking Answers to Drugs, Violence: Leader Encourages More Reports. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE.
Nov. 20, 1993, at Al (indicating that "[flirearms. knives, marijuana, cocaine, simple battery.
aggravated battery, sexual battery, aggravated assault, and simple assault" are typical major
offenses in New Orleans public schools while such offenses have not been reported in parochial
schools).
I See Alexi Barrionuevo, Cracking Down on Violence; Schools Chief Stiffens Gun, Drug
Penalties, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1993. at 1N. Some public schools provide teachers
and principals with hand-held metal detectors. Id. In addition, some schools already have metal
detectors installed indoors, while other schools are inquiring about in-school video monitoring of
hallways and other areas. Id.; see also Beth Frerking, Schools Slamming Lockers to Curb
Violence, Drugs, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 4, 1994, at A9 (noting that some schools have
removed or wired shut student lockers in effort to decrease storage of drugs and guns. and to
reduce number of fights which take place near lockers).
8 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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court opinion in favor of the school district and held that these students did
have free speech rights in schools as long as their actions did not cause
"substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities" or
infringe upon the rights of others. 9  Although the Tinker decision
concerned students' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of expression, it served as a precursor for many students' rights
cases.
Tinker and subsequent Supreme Court decisions expanded students'
rights, while also imposing limitations on these rights. In times of danger
and emergency, both real and perceived, some of these rights have gone by
the wayside. Thus, the judicial system, as well as educators, must be ever
vigilant in preserving these rights. This Article discusses the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights granted students by the courts, the limitations
imposed on these rights, and the circumstances which have caused
subsequent courts to set aside these rights. Part One will examine
students' rights to privacy guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and
interpreted by the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.0
and subsequent court decisions. Part Two will discuss students' due
process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and interpreted,
most notably, by the Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez. " Part
Three will review the condition of students' Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights twenty-five years after Tinker.
I. THE FoURrH AMENDMENT AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affinnation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.' 2
A. Students' Rights Under the Fourth Amendment
New Jersey v. T.L. 0. 3 was the first Supreme Court decision
addressing the authority of public school officials to conduct searches of
9 Id. at 514.
10 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
"419 U.S. 565 (1975).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
' 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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students on school grounds.'4  The Court established "reasonable
suspicion" as the standard for conducting these searches.15
The incident that prompted the T.L.O. case arose when the vice
principal of Piscataway (N.J.) High School searched the purse of T.L.O.,
a female student accused of smoking cigarettes in violation of school rules.
T.L.O., a fourteen year old freshman at the time of the incident, was called
to the principal's office after a teacher reported seeing her and another
female student holding lit cigarettes in the women's lavatory. Although the
school permitted smoking in certain restricted areas, smoking in restrooms
was a violation of a school rule.' 6
The assistant vice principal questioned both students and T.L.O.'s
companion admitted to smoking. T.L.O., however, denied smoking and
stated that she did not smoke at all. The assistant vice principal then
demanded to see T.L.O.'s purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of
cigarettes and some rolling papers that were the type generally used in
smoking marijuana. " T.L.O. was suspended from school for ten days;
three days for smoking cigarettes and seven days for possessing marijua-
na. 18
The assistant vice principal contacted T.L.O.'s mother and turned the
evidence over to the police. T.L.O. was accompanied to police headquar-
ters by her mother, where she confessed to selling marijuana at the high
school. On the basis of this evidence, the State brought delinquency
charges against T.L.O. 9 Under the exclusionary rule, evidence seized
illegally may not be introduced into evidence in a subsequent judicial
proceeding."0 At her trial, T.L.O. filed a motion to have the evidence
" T.L.O. was, in fact, the only United States Supreme Court decision to rule on the Fourth
Amendment rights of public school students until Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton. 115 S. CE.
2386 (1995), a drug testing case that was decided the summer after the St. John's University
School of Law Tinker Symposium. See infra mptes 113-32 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Acton case.
11 T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 329.
16 Id. at 328.
'7 Id. at 328, 347. Upon further inspection, the assistant vice principal found some marijuana,
a pipe, plastic bags, forty dollars (mostly in one dollar bills), an index card with the words
"people who owe me money" written on it followed by a list of names and dollar amounts, and
two letters implicating T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. Id. at 347.
IS T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329 n.1. T.L.O. did not suffer the seven-day suspension for
possession of marijuana. Id.
'9 In re T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327 (Middlesex County Ct. 1980).
o Jurisdictions disagree on whether the exclusionary rule applies to school officials' violations
of students' Fourth Amendment rights. Compare State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga.) (holding
exclusionary rule does not apply), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975) with People v. D., 315
N.E.2d 466 (N.Y. 1974) (holding exclusionary rule precludes production of evidence obtained
[Vol. 69:481
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suppressed on the grounds that it had been seized in violation of her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. T.L.O.
considered the search unreasonable because nothing in her purse could
prove that she had been smoking.2 '
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the search had violated
T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. 2 While the New Jersey Supreme
Court believed that "reasonable grounds" was the appropriate standard to
use in this case, it maintained that the assistant vice principal had not had
"reasonable grounds" to believe that T.L.O. was carrying evidence of
criminal involvement in activities that would seriously interfere with school
discipline.2 The Court held, therefore, that the evidence found in
T.L.O.'s purse had to be excluded, and set aside the conviction.24 The
State of New Jersey appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming
broadly that the exclusionary rule should not apply to searches made by
public school administrators.25
After oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court scheduled
reargument on a different, somewhat narrower, question: In opening
T.L.O.'s purse, did the assistant vice principal violate the Fourth
Amendment?' Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision, holding by a 6-3 majority that the search had
been reasonable.27
Thus, New Jersey v. TL.O. resolved several important legal issues.
The Court maintained that students have rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment and that a "reasonable suspicion" standard is appropriate for
determining the constitutionality of searches similar in magnitude to the
search in TL.O.' The Court characterized school officials as state actors
and, at least in the context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, set to rest
the in loco parentis doctrine which had likened school authorities to parents
rather than to government agents. 29
While the T.L. 0. decision granted students certain rights, it also
imposed limitations on these rights. As a result of this decision, students'
through unlawful school search in delinquency proceedings).
"T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 329.
New Jersey v. Engerud. 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983).
2 Id. at 942.
24 Id. at 944.
- T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330-31.
2 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
11 The majority opinion was accompanied by four concurring and dissenting opinions. T.L. 0.,
469 U.S. at 325-27.
28 Id. at 341.
.9 Id. at 336.
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privacy rights in public schools are afforded a lower standard of protection
than is usually given to citizens.3" The Supreme Court balanced the
Fourth Amendment rights of students against school officials' obligations
to maintain a safe environment and arrived at the "reasonable suspicion"
standard for evaluating school searches.
In contrast, under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, for a search
of a citizen to be legal, police officers must have probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be
found in the place to be searched.3  After T.L.O., public school officials
need only to have a "reasonable suspicion" that a law or school rule had
been violated to justify searching a student, a far more lenient standard.
The reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied by meeting two
requirements. First, the search must be justified at its inception.32  A
search will satisfy this requirement when "there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school."33 Second, the
search must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
prompted the search.34 A search is permissible in scope when "the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction. ', 35
Several important concerns arose concerning the reasonable suspicion
standard and the limitations that it placed on students' rights.36 The first
concern was that the standard was vague. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Brennan vehemently opposed the adoption of a new standard predicting that
the standard would be difficult to apply and, consequently, would weaken
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.37 In addition, a number of
commentators emphasized the need for increased judicial interpretation
fearing that the standard would be abused or misunderstood, and that a lack
of clarity would result in more litigation.38
30 Id.
"' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
32 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
3" T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
.' Tern., 392 U.S. at 21.
'. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
36 Id. at 343. The Court was concerned about whether this standard would intrude on
student's privacy rights. Id.
." Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
s See Charles W. Avery & Robert J. Simpson, Search and Seizure: A RiskAssessment Model
for Public School Officials, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 403, 412 (1987); Larry Bartlett. New Jersey v.
T.L.O.: Not an End to School Search Litigation or Commentaries, 23 EDUC. LAW REP. 801, 807
[Vol. 69:481
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Secondly, in developing the standard, the Court did not differentiate
between a student's criminal act and a student's violation of a trivial school
rule.3 9 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens pointed out that for the
Court, "a search for curlers and sunglasses ... is apparently just as
important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang
activity. "4I
Thirdly, there was a great deal of concern as to when the reasonable
suspicion standard was applicable.' TL. 0. was a narrow decision that
applied only to searches similar in nature to the search conducted in that
particular case.4' Many issues were left open simply because they were
not in dispute in T.L. 0.
1. Individualized Suspicion
Firstly, the T.L. 0. Court failed to decide whether this standard should
be extended to searches with non-individualized suspicion. The search in
T.L. 0. involved individualized suspicion; the assistant vice principal was
informed that T.L.O. was suspected of smoking.' Individualized
suspicion is suspicion that a particular individual has engaged in
misconduct or may be in possession of contraband or evidence of
misconduct.4' Nonindividualized suspicion exists where student miscon-
duct is suspected, but the suspicion is directed at the student population in
general, or a certain segment of the student population, rather than at a
(1985).
.9 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-42 (discussing only criminal conduct).
o Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 See Martin R. Gardner. Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal For An
Individualized Suspicion Requirementfor Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L.
REV. 897 (1988) (detailing three hypothetical scenarios and difficulty in applying reasonable
suspicion standard).
42 See, e.g., Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that standard
discussed in T.L.O. would not be extended to search of nude girl for evidence of sexual assault
by parents).
43 T.L.0., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8; see Gardner. supra note 41, at 898 (asserting that T.L.0.
decision left open question of whether individualized suspicion is essential element of applicable
standard).
' For a detailed discussion of individualized suspicion in the context of public schools, see.
Gardner. supra note 41.
4 See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding constitutional search
conducted with particularized suspicion of specific individual for possession of marijuana after
school officials personally observed and received confirmation of individual's identity by fellow
student), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); cf. Gardner. supra note 41, at 939 (stating that
"stop and frisk" of individual is permissible when police officer has -reasonable suspicion" that
particular individual has, is, or is about to be involved in criminal activity).
1995]
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specific individual. 6 Factually not in issue, the T.L.O. Court did not
specifically decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element
of the reasonableness standard.47 The Court did note, however, that "the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of individualized
suspicion '48 and that "[iln other contexts . . . [this Court has] held that
S.. 'some quantum of individualized suspicion' is usually a prerequisite
to a constitutional search or seizure. 49
2. Degree of Intrusion
Secondly, the Court failed to discuss whether the reasonable suspicion
standard should apply to searches more intrusive than the TL.0. purse
search. Legal commentators ° and lower courts5 have assumed, for the
most part, that these searches would have a difficult time conforming to the
reasonable suspicion standard. Generally, the more intrusive the search,
the greater the need for justification of that search. In his dissenting
opinion in T.L.O., Justice Stevens maintained that if deeply intrusive
searches are ever reasonable, it must "only be to prevent imminent, and
serious harm."53
Myron Schreck. The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: Issues for the 1990's and
Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 146 (1993).
47 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8. Several courts have required individualized suspicion for
searches of students. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding canine sniffing of students for drugs without individualized suspicion illegal). cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
4 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543.
560-61 (1976)): see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (explaining that
routine inspection of private property involves minor intrusion that does not require individualized
suspicion).
49 T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 342 n.8. But see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton. 115 S. Ct. 2386.
2395 (1995) ("In many respects. we think, testing based on 'suspicion' of drug use would not be
better, but worse.").
I See, e.g., Avery & Simpson, supra note 38. at 412 (noting that strip searches are
extremely difficult to justify in school setting); Bartlett, supra note 38. at 807 (noting that five
federal courts held strip searches illegal without warrant or probable cause).
" See, e.g., Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir.) (holding strip search of prison
visitor constitutional because there was individualized suspicion). cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 387
(1995). A strip search, no matter how carefully executed, is a highly intrusive search that is
embarrassing and humiliating to the individual. Id. at 1019.
5- See Avery & Simpson, supra note 38, at 415.
. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
indicated that in Doe v. Renfrow. the Seventh Circuit Court noted that: "It does not require a
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of
constitutional rights of some magnitude." Id. (quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91. 92-93 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 451 U.S. 1022 (1981)), cf. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982-83
(6th Cir. 1984) (dictum) (stating that degrading body cavity search of student would not be
STUDENTS' RIGHTS AFTER TINKER
3. Searches by Non-School Officials
Lastly, while the Court established reasonable suspicion as the
standard for school officials' searching of students, it did not address
searches in schools conducted by non-school officials, such as police
officers. Concerns were expressed that the police might take advantage of
the lesser standard afforded to school officials by assisting administrators
or having them hand over evidence of criminal activity "on a silver platter"
to law enforcement agencies. 4 The Court clearly stated that it would
"consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and
on their own authority,"55 and noted that it would not express an opinion
on the appropriate standard for "searches conducted by school officials in
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies. "56
B. The Diminution of Students' Fourth Amendment Rights
Beginning with Tinker, the United States Supreme Court has
maintained that students have constitutional rights in public schools.
Sixteen years later in T.L.O., the Court acknowledged that these rights
extend to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unlawful searches and
seizures. The TL. 0. Court also established limitations upon these rights,
reasonable), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
-1 Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey at 23, New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (No. 83-712) (1983); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960) (striking down "silver platter" doctrine).
" T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.
6 Id.
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including the imposition of a more lenient "reasonable suspicion" standard.
Due to the vagueness of the reasonable suspicion standard and the
narrow reach of the T.L. 0. opinion, subsequent courts were forced, with
little guidance, to interpret the reasonable suspicion standard in different
contexts with a resulting diminution of students' rights. 7
1. Individualized Suspicion
The T.L. 0. Court enumerated the levels of intrusion where individu-
alized suspicion is not a prerequisite to the search as "where the privacy
interests implicated by a search are minimal and where 'other safeguards'
are available 'to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official in the field."'. 58
For example, courts have established exceptions related to levels of
intrusiveness into students' privacy and issues of safety,59 even though
individualized suspicion has generally been considered a prerequisite for
searches.' Many lower courts, concerned with drugs and violence in the
schools, have held a search reasonable: (1) if the suspicion is narrowed to
a small group of students; (2) if there is immediate danger to others; or (3)
if there has been a history of problems.6"
- Id. at 365 (Brennan. J., dissenting), see Joseph R. McKinney. The Fourth Amendment and
the Public Schools: Reasonable Suspicion in the 1990s, 91 EDUC. LAW. REP. 455. 457 (1994)
(noting that thirty-one of thirty-six post-T.L.O. school search cases were decided in school
district's favor after court applied reasonable suspicion standard). McKinney acknowledged that
the high level of scrutiny employed by the courts in these cases illustrates their concern for the
constitutional rights of students. Id.; see also J.M. Sanchez. Expelling the Fourth Amendment
from American Schools: Students' Rights Six Years After T.L.O., 21 J.L. & EDUC. 381. 409
(1992) (concluding that courts have used T.L.0. to expand school officials' power at expense of
students' constitutional protections). Butsee David B. Rubin. Passing Through the "Schoolhouse
Gate": Constitutional Implications of Preserving Student Safeiy. 154 N.J. LAW. 36 (1993)
(asserting that students still enjoy constitutional liberties when in school custody and control).
11 T.L.0., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)
(citations omitted)). The T.L.O. Court did not consider exceptions to individualized suspicion in
reaching its decision because the disputed search was based on suspicion of an individual. Id.
" See, e.g., T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325: United States v. Martinez-Fuente. 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(ruling that routine checkpoint stops were consistent with Fourth Amendment).
I See, e.g., Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding urine drug tests
of firefighters and police officers unconstitutional absent individualized suspicion). Ascher v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994) (holding roadside sobriety checks
unconstitutional without individualized suspicion); State v. Estrada, 810 P.2d 817 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991) (holding border patrol searches must be based on individualized suspicion).
61 See McKinney, supra note 57, at 459; see also Martinez v. School Dist. No. 60. 852 P.2d
1275 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that search was reasonable when student was noticeably
intoxicated); Massachusetts v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (holding that search of
locker for marijuana was reasonable when it was clear that student was dealing drugs to other
students); South Carolina v. Mississippi, 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1991) (holding that search of
[Vol. 69:481
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Illustrative is In re Alexander B.,62 wherein the court employed
several of these exceptions63 to uphold a search that lacked individualized
suspicion. In Alexander, an administrator was breaking up a clash between
two groups of students known to be associated with different gangs in the
neighborhood. An unidentified member of one group said, "Don't pick on
us; one of those guys has a gun."' On the direction of the Dean, a
police officer standing nearby searched the members of this group, and
found a machete knife and scabbard in Alexander's possession. 65
The Alexander Court acknowledged the importance of individualized
suspicion,' yet distinguished the search from other mass searches by
noting that suspicion was focused on a group of five or six students.67 It
further found that "[g]iven the potential danger to students and staff which
would have resulted from inaction, a weapons search of the several accused
students was reasonable." 68  The court reasoned that "the gravity of the
danger posed by possession of a firearm or other weapon on campus"
outweighed "the relatively minor intrusion involved." 69 Thus, the court
upheld the search even though it lacked individualized suspicion.7'
In the only recorded case to date on the use of metal detectors in
public schools, People v. Dukes,7 the search involved large numbers of
student's locker was reasonable when school administrators knew student was selling handguns):
In re Gregory M., 627 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1993) (noting that search of student's bookbag by
security officer was reasonable when student entered with no I.D. and bag made loud thud when
it hit floor); In re Kevin P., 587 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that search was
reasonable when security officer felt gun in waistband); In re F.B., 658 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995) (holding that administrative search for weapons was reasonable to ensure public safety);
Washington v. Slattery, 787 P.2d 932 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that search of student's
car was reasonable when official had reliable information that student was selling drugs in parking
lot); In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637 (Wis.) (holding that random search of students' lockers was
reasonable in light of several gun-related incidents at school that placed faculty and students in
imminent danger), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 231 (1993).
6 270 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
6- Id. at 344. The court upheld the search on the basis of the school officials' reasonable
belief that the student possessed a weapon. Id. The school had reliable information, suspicion was
focused on a small group of students, and the potential gravity of the possession of a dangerous
weapon on school grounds outweighed the minor intrusion resulting from the search of high
school boys. Id.
6' Id. at 343.
1 Alexander, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 344.
63 Id.
69 Id.
' Alexander, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
71 580 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
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students72 and was not conducted in reaction to an immediate situation as
in Alexander.73 Instead, the school in Dukes justified the searches as a
preventative measure resulting from genuine safety concerns that were
sparked by students being killed in other New York City schools.74
In Dukes, a hand-held metal detector, used as part of a routine search
by a police officer employed by the school district, signaled the presence
of metal in the purse of Tawana Dukes, a student at Washington Irving
High School in New York City.75 The student complied when asked to
open the bag. The officer reached into her purse and took out a manila
folder which Ms. Dukes agreed to open at the officer's request.76 Inside
the folder, the police officer saw a black switchblade knife which Dukes
said she had for her protection.77 She was charged with criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Dukes moved to suppress the
evidence claiming that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated.7"
In rendering its opinion, the Dukes Court did not use the T.L.O.
reasonable suspicion standard, but instead applied an administrative search
doctrine.79 Under this doctrine, searches are reasonable only if the
intrusion is "no greater than necessary to satisfy the governmental interest
underlying the need for the search."'  These searches, which require
_, Id. at 852.
7- Alexander. 270 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
7 The court validated this concern by noting that school records reflected that over 2.000
weapons were recovered during the 1990-91 school year and that there had been a recent shooting
in a nearby high school. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
7-' Id. at 851.
76 Id.
71 d.
78 Id. at 850.
7' Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53.
' Id. at 852. Courts have used the administrative search doctrine to justify metal detector
searches in other public places, such as airports, where there is an overwhelming governmental
interest in deterring air piracy, aircraft hijacking, and other acts of violence; and courthouses.
where there is a vital government interest in protecting sensitive facilities from the realization of
threatened violence. See People v. Kuhn, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1973) (finding predeparture
metal detector searches in airport constitutional and reasonable in light of overwhelming public
danger): McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1978) (justifying courthouse metal
detector search as legitimate administrative search to deter violence in courthouse); see also
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding airport metal detector searches
constitutional and reasonable as precaution against airplane hijacking); United States v. Davis.
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (describing reasonableness standard applied with respect to airport
metal detectors). The United States Supreme Court has employed a balancing test to weigh the
degree of intrusion against the severity of the danger imposed. See Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (finding state highway sobriety checkpoint program reasonable
under Fourth Amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (upholding mandatory drug-screening urinalysis testing of customs employees required to
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neither probable cause nor the issuance of a warrant, are aimed at a group
or class of people and are designed to prevent a dangerous event from
occurring."' Individualized suspicion is not necessary in an administrative
search because "any member of the group or class may be the agent who
could cause the dangerous event to take place." I
School field trip cases illustrate the division among courts as to
whether individualized suspicion is necessary for a search to be reason-
able.' In Kuehn v. Renton School District No. 403,8 the court held
unconstitutional the mass searching of students' luggage prior to a high
school band concert. 5 The court used a reasonableness standard similar
to T.L.O. to determine the legality of the search. 86 The Kuehn court
concluded that such searches are not reasonable if conducted without
individualized suspicion and "solely for the purpose of deterring disruptive
conduct. "I
In comparison, in Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Educa-
tion,8 a New Jersey Superior Court concluded that individualized
suspicion was not necessary for searching students' luggage prior to a
recreational field trip. 9 The court upheld the use of the school district's
fifteen year old search policy' because of "the unique burdens placed on
school personnel in the field trip context" and because the search was
limited to that of hand luggage.9'
carry firearms or directly involved in drug interdiction): Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (allowing drug and alcohol tests of railroad employees, as mandated
by Federal Railroad Administration, and as justified by need to curtail alcohol and drug related
train accidents).
8' Dukes. 580 N.Y.S. 2d at 851.
. Id. at 852.
Conpare, Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 694 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1985) with Desilets
v. Clearview Regional Bd. of Educ.. 627 A.2d 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
14 694 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1985).
8- Id. at 1083.
6 Id. at 1081. The court reiterated the standard used to determine reasonableness that it set
forth previously. The school must look at the student's "age, history, and school record, the
prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the
exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of the
information used as justification for the search." Id. at 1081 (citing State v. McKinnon. 558 P.2d
781 (Wash. 1977)). The court found that none of the criteria met in the case and that the school
officials did not believe they would find anything else. Id.
87 Id. at 1079.
627 A.2d 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
I d. at 672-73.
Id. Although the district was relatively free from serious discipline problems, the court felt
the policy was justified. Id.
91 Id. at 673.
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Although the school's policy was directed primarily at possession of
drugs, alcohol, and weapons, the court decided that such a policy would
deter students from bringing other potentially dangerous items on field
trips, such as sports knives, school-made rockets, a discus, slingshots, or
fireworks, 92 merely to "show off."93  While the school board's policy
was aimed at very specific items, the Desilets Court expanded the policy's
scope, and consequently, diminished students' rights.94  The court
broadened past notions of school safety by recognizing that not only do
school officials have a duty to protect students from each other, but that in
the context of a field trip, there is an additional "duty to protect the general
population from student mischief."'95
Courts are divided with respect to another suspicionless search,
employing canines to sniff out drugs.96 They have distinguished between
sniffing inanimate objects such as lockers or automobiles, which are not
considered searches under the Fourth Amendment, and sniffing human
beings, which does constitute a search.97
The most dramatic differences of opinion among the lower courts have
involved mass drug testing of students. 98 These courts have acknowl-
edged that students have Fourth Amendment rights and that blood and urine
testing falls within Fourth Amendment protection as it constitutes a search
' See, e.g., Engel v. Gosper, 177 A.2d 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962) (involving
school-made rocket), Poelker v. Macon Community Sch. Dist.. 571 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (involving student struck by discus before track meet). appealdenied. 580 N.E.2d 132 (Il1.
1991). Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 351 N.Y.S. 2d 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (involving
student injured by firecracker).
9' Desilets, 627 A.2d 667.
4 Id.
I Id. at 672.
1 See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (holding that use of dogs
to sniff students for drugs did not constitute search under Fourth Amendment), aff'd, 631 F.2d
91 (7th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981): Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist..
877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding random canine sniffing of students' automobiles). cert.
denied. 496 U.S. 935 (1990): Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981) (allowing sniff
search of students' lockers by police dogs).
I Compare Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (ruling
that using dogs to sniff students' bodies violated Fourth Amendment because students were
touched by dogs and because there was no individualized suspicion, but that sniffing of lockers
and automobiles was legal), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983) with Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch.
Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (holding canine sniffing of students without
individualized suspicion unconstitutional and noting that school did not have sufficient interest to
search students' cars because students did not have access to such cars during day).
" Compare O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(upholding college urine testing program for athletes) with Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 69, 863 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1994) (holding random urine testing of athletes
violated privacy rights of students), rev'd, 66 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1995).
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of body fluids.99 Various courts have held that drug testing is unconstitu-
tional if conducted in a highly intrusive manner or if aimed at all students
or certain groups of students in the absence of a drug problem."°° Others
have maintained that mass drug testing of students is legal.'
0
'
In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corporation,10 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a school district's
random drug testing of interscholastic athletes and cheerleaders did not
violate students' Fourth Amendment rights to privacy. The court
recognized that individualized suspicion is generally necessary to conduct
a reasonable search, but noted that there are exceptions to this rule.
03
The court maintained that the case at hand fell within these exceptions
because: 1) these students had diminished expectations of privacy; 2)
unlawful conditions could not be detected by other means; 3) the regulatory
scheme limited discretion on the part of government officials; and 4) the
searches were conducted for civil, non-punitive, purposes rather than as
part of a criminal investigation. '4
The court reasoned that the students involved had diminished
expectations of privacy because they were athletes and, thus, were
accustomed to communal undress.0 5 In addition, in order to participate
in athletics the students were required to submit urine samples as part of
their physical examinations.' 5 Involvement in interscholastic athletics
conditioned the students to expect significant school regulation including
rules, set forth by the Indiana High School Athletic Association, regarding
residency, minimum grades, and other training rules prohibiting the use of
drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes. 107 These factors, combined with the strong
emphasis upon drug testing of college and professional athletes, contributed
to a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of high school athletes
I See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (holding that
testing blood, urine, and breath is search within meaning of Fourth Amendment).
10' See Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (ruling against drug testing of
three female students required to urinate in presence of school officials to ensure genuine sample):
Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (ruling
against drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities in absence of individualized
suspicion when no serious drug problems existed in school). aff'd. 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991):
Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional Sch. Dist.. 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1985) (ruling against drug testing as part of physical examination for all students).
0I See infra text accompanying notes 102-112.
1' 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
103 Id. at 1316-17.
I'l Id. at 1322.
105 Id. at 1318.
10 Id.
107 Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.
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as opposed to students involved in other school activities such as band or
chess. 18
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court's determination that drug use at the school could neither be detected
nor deterred by alternative methods."°9 In addition, since the students
were tested by drawing random numbers, the expectation of privacy was
not "'subject to the discretion of the official in the field."' 0 Lastly, the
school's urinalysis program was not designed to uncover criminal activity,
and sanctions were progressive, emphasizing rehabilitation rather than
punishment. 'I The court concluded by noting that:
The plague of illicit drug use which currently threatens our nation's
schools adds a major dimension to the difficulties the schools face in
fulfilling their purpose-the education of our children. If the schools are
to survive and prosper, school administrators must have reasonable means
at their disposal to deter conduct which substantially disrupts the school
environment. In this case, we believe that the Tippecanoe County School
Corporation has chosen a reasonable and limited response to a serious
evil. 112
In Acton v. Vernonia School District,"3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that a school's drug testing
program violated students' constitutional rights against unlawful search and
seizure. The school had a history of drug-related problems, including
gangs that had developed around a drug culture and sports-related accidents
that the faculty believed were caused by drug use.' "' The plaintiff was
a seventh grader who was unable to participate in the football program
because he and his parents refused to sign the drug testing consent form
required for all athletes." 5
The court found that a drug problem existed in the school; at least one
drug related accident had occurred; and the program was an efficient means
to curb drug use and discipline students." 6  Nonetheless, in light of the
nature of this suspicionless search, as well as the serious intrusion upon
students' privacy rights, the court could not justify the random drug testing
108 Id. at 1319.
-o Id. at 1321.
110 Id. at 1316 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
Id. at 1322.
11- Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324.
13 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
14 Id. at 1516.
"' Id. at 1517.
116 Id. at 1522.
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of students. "7
Unlike Schaill, the Acton Court did not characterize grade point
averages and training rules as equal to the kind of government regulations
that would justify suspicionless searches."' In addition, the court
disagreed that athletes had a reduced expectation of privacy regarding their
bodily functions just because they undressed with each other in locker
rooms;" 9 finding the elimination of body fluids, under supervision of
school officials, to be much more private than communal undress. 20 The
court also maintained that participation in athletics was not a privilege, but
a desirable component of all students' education and should be available to
any student who wished to participate.'
The court did not diminish the detrimental effect drug use has both in
our schools and in our society and the importance of curbing its abuse.
However, unlike other cases upholding random drug testing of employees
in hazardous occupations,"'2 the Ninth Circuit maintained that the danger
from drugs in schools did not constitute a compelling government
interest. 11 The Acton court did not balance students' privacy rights
against the school's "substantial interest in enforcement of its proposed
random urinalysis program" as the Schaill court did. 2 4 Ultimately, it
was the lack of a compelling interest that led the court to hold the drug
testing program unconstitutional. " The Acton court acknowledged that
the circumstances underlying its decision were very much like those in
Schaill. Referring to the Schaill decision, the Acton court stated:
Perhaps that court found a more compelling set of facts than we discover
here, but we are unable to say so after reading the opinion. We believe,
instead, that the Seventh Circuit has unduly minimized the privacy
interests of students. It has also given undue weight to the governmental
interest by focusing on the general problems generated by the drug
17 Id. at 1527.
11 Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525. The court compared the school regulations to regulations imposed
by the government that justify suspicionless searches and concluded that the Schaill Court's
analogy was unsound. Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
1' Acton. 23 F.3d at 1523-24 (approving drug testing of train employees in light of number
of serious accidents (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Excecutives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)),
vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); see National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656. 678 (1989) (approving drug testing of front-line and gun-toting workers).
'- Acton. 23 F.3d at 1525.
14 Id. at 1527.
125 Id. at 1527 n.3.
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plague, rather than upon the question of whether the danger to safety is
so high as to be compelling. We could fill more pages reiterating what
we have already said, but, in a nutshell, we simply do not agree with the
Seventh Circuit. 26
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's conclusions regarding the student's expectation
of privacy and the interests of the government in random urinalysis testing
starkly contrasted with the rationale of the Seventh Circuit, and provided
the basis for reversal by the Supreme Court. 27
The majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Acton
substantially affects student athletes' Fourth Amendment rights while
leaving open the question of the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing
of an entire student population.' The Court's decision was limited to
the circumstances in this particular case. 29 The Court acknowledged that
although schools do not exercise primary parental power over students, 3 '
the custodial and tutelary nature of the schools is a factor that diminishes
students' privacy expectations.' Ultimately, the Supreme Court held
that school searches should be based upon a standard of reasonableness,
determined by balancing the individual students' interests against the
interests of the government. 32
2. Degree of Intrusion
The T.L. 0. Court did not specifically address the issue of highly
intrusive searches. While lower courts' and legal scholars have
126 Id. at 1527.
7 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
128 Id. at 2396.
129 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (stressing danger of assuming that -suspicionless drug testing
will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts"). The Court emphasized several factors
in determining that student athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy: (1) the custodial
role of the state as schoolmaster: (2) the physical examinations and vaccinations common to all
students, (3) and the nature of communal undress with which athletes are familiar. Id. at 2392-93.
The Court also characterized the government concern as compelling. id. at 2395-96, stressing the
importance of deterrence, the increased risk of physical harm, and the role of athletes as leaders.
Id. at 2395. Lastly, the Court concluded that taking a urine sample was a minimal intrusion on
the privacy of the athletes. Id. at 2393-94.
130 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 2396-97.
131 See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir.) (condemning strip search conducted
without reasonable cause), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1980); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977.
983 (6th Cir. 1984) (dictum) (noting unreasonableness of body cavity search for minor
infraction): Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing unreasonableness of
strip search on school bus): M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting strip search
based upon mere reasonable suspicion): Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454. 458 (E.D.
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considered such searches to be illegal,' 34 there have been a number of
recent cases upholding strip searches in the interests of safety.'35 Two
of these cases, Williams v. Ellington'36 and Cornfield v. Consolidated
School District No. 230 ,' come from federal courts of appeals.
In the Williams case, Angela Williams, a student at Graves County
High School in Kentucky, was strip searched down to her underwear by a
female assistant principal.'38 Administrators based their suspicion on the
"totality of circumstances" which included reports from both a fellow
student and a teacher; and a note found under Angela's desk implying that
she and her friends were using the "rich man's drug.'
139
After further investigations, the school's principal requested Ms.
Easley, the assistant principal, to help conduct the search."'s Ms. Easley
then took Angela into her office and searched her in the presence of a
female secretary. Finding nothing, Easley asked Williams to remove her
T-shirt, lower her jeans to her knees, and remove her shoes and socks. No
drugs were found. Upon hearing about the search, Angela's father filed
suit.' 4'
In ruling for the defendant school district, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the search was reasonable because it was performed
Mich. 1985) (holding that scope of search must be reasonably related to its objective); Bellnier
v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y 1977) (finding strip search of children to find missing
three dollars unreasonable); Picha v. Wieglos. 410 F. Supp 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (involving strip
search for drugs without reasonable suspicion), Potts v. Wright. 357 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (involving strip search of eight female students to find missing ring).
'-1 See, e.g., Schreck, supra note 46, at 147 (predicting that reasonable suspicion would not
be enough for strip search even though probable cause might justify intrusive search); Steven F.
Shatz, et al., The Strip Searching of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 1,
9 (1991) (noting that application of T.L.O. reasonableness standard to strip searches is problemat-
ic).
'. See generally Lawrence F. Rossow & Brenda Stubblefield, Student Strip Search Upheld:
Williams by Williams v. Ellington. 75 EDUC. L. REP. 723 (1992) (discussing ramifications of
upholding highly intrusive searches); Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Strip Searching After Williams:
Reactions to the Concern for School Safet.?, 93 EDUc. L. REP. 1107 (1994) (evaluating
significance of Williams in diminishing Fourth Amendment protection of students).
1-- 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
,.7 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993).
133 Williams. 936 F.2d at 883.
131 Id. at 882. Ginger informed administrators that Angela and her friend Michelle had "a
clear glass vial containing a white powder." Id. Angela's teacher noted that Michelle had been
exhibiting "flu-like" symptoms. Id. Michelle's father revealed that Michelle had stolen $200 from
him which he feared was for drugs. Id.
140 Williams, 936 F.2d at 882-83. After being confronted by the principal, Michelle produced
a brown vial containing "rush," an over-the-counter legal substance, the inhalation of which is
illegal. Id. A search of Angela's locker, purse, and pockets revealed no evidence of drugs. Id.
14, Id. at 883.
1995]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in accordance with a facially valid district-wide policy. 4 z Relying upon
the TL. 0. decision and the standards contained therein, the court held that
the school's policy allowed for "the search of a pupil's person if there
[was] a reasonable suspicion that the student [was] concealing evidence of
an illegal activity." '143 The court further maintained that the search was
justified at its inception based upon the "totality of circumstances" that
created the suspicion that Angela was concealing evidence.'"
The court also reasoned that the scope of the search was justified
because the student was suspected of carrying a small glass vial containing
a white, powdery substance believed to be illicit drugs. 45 Searches
conducted immediately before the strip search revealed that the vial was not
in the student's locker or in her purse." Therefore, it was reasonable
to assume the student had the vial on her person."
In Cornfield v. Consolidated School District No. 230,"8 Brian
Cornfield, a sixteen year old male high school student, was suspected of
concealing drugs after a female teacher's aide reported that she had
observed Cornfield and that he appeared "too well-endowed." "9 In
accordance with a school policy, school officials requested permission for
the search from Cornfield's mother, who refused. 5°
Nonetheless, the officials conducted the search, which consisted of a
visual inspection of the student's naked body as well as a physical
inspection of his discarded clothes. The search was conducted in the boys'
locker room, away from the other students. No one touched the student
and school officials stood at a distance from Cornfield while he dis-
robed. 5'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the search as reasonable,
142 Id. at 884.
"' Williams, 936 F.2d at 884. The reasonableness of a search is determined by its
justification at its inception and whether its scope is reasonably related to the circumstances which
justified it. New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985): see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1. 20 (1968).
'44 Williams, 936 F.2d at 889.
14- Id. at 887.
146 Id.
14" Williams. 936 F.2d at 882-83. The court compared the facts of T.L. 0. to the circumstanc-
es of the present case. In T.L.0., the vice principal's discovery of rolling papers in the student's
purse created reasonable suspicion warranting an extended search. Id. Similarly, in Williams. after
the vial containing "rush" was produced, the principal's suspicions were raised. warranting an
extended search. Id.
'48 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993).
141 Id. at 1319.
ISO Id.
151 Id.
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relying upon both Williams and the two-pronged test for reasonable
suspicion established by the TL.O. decision. 52  The court maintained
that the search was reasonable at its inception because it was based on a
series of observations and incidents reported by various teachers and aides
during the week prior to the search. These reports included the observa-
tion of the unusual bulge in Cornfield's sweat pants (which was corroborat-
ed by a number of witnesses), as well as statements from teachers and
administrators that Cornfield had said he failed a urinalysis for cocaine and
had once "crotched" drugs during a police raid at his mother's house.
153
Although Cornfield denied a number of these allegations, the court
maintained that the school officials' observations as well as recent incidents
resulted in a "cumulative effect" which was sufficient to create a reason-
able suspicion that Cornfield was "crotching" drugs."'
The Court felt that the scope of the search was reasonable because a
no less intrusive search was available, given the school authorities'
suspicion that Cornfield was "crotching" drugs and given that a pat-down
search would have been more intrusive than the strip search. 
55
Mark Anthony B. 56 provides an interesting contrast to the decisions
in Williams and Cornfield. Despite a similar fact pattern, the West Virginia
State Supreme Court refused to uphold the strip search of a student accused
of stealing money. In rendering this decision, the Court noted that the
student's suspected conduct "did not pose the type of immediate danger to
others that might ... justify a warrantless strip search.", 57  The court
did, however, imply that if the search were for drugs or weapons, it might
be justified.'
152 Id. at 1323.
113 Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1323. There were other incidents including: a report by Cornfield's
school bus driver that he had smelled marijuana where Cornfield had been sitting on the bus; a
report by a student who observed that Cornfield had been smoking marijuana on the bus; a tip
from another student that Cornfield was selling marijuana to students: and a call from a local
police officer stating that he had received information that Cornfield was selling marijuana.
Finally. there had been an earlier incident where Cornfield was found in possession of a live
bullet at school. Id.
1-1 Id. (citing Williams. 936 F.2d 881).
' Id. The court stressed the student's age as a factor in determining whether a strip search
was reasonable. Id. at 1320-21.
' 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993).
151 Id. at 49. The court concluded that the infraction did not rise to the level necessary to
interfere with maintaining order in the school as to make a strip search reasonable. Id. (-'[Tlhe
reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than
is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools."' (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985)).
"I Id. at 49.
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3. Searches by Non-School Officials
With increased incidence of drug use and violence in the schools,
police have assumed broader roles than ever before. 159 They may provide
"tips" to school officials, request a search, or assist in a search at the
behest of school administrators"s' by bringing canines into the schools to
sniff lockers, cars, or possibly students. 161  In an increasing number of
cases, police are employed by the school system. 62 While probable
cause is the required standard for a search conducted by a police officer or
an agent of the police, such relationships are not always clear.63 The
extent and complexity of the role of police in schools today, coupled with
silence on the part of the T.L.0. Court, sometimes leaves school adminis-
trators uncertain as to the appropriate standard for searching students in
schools. 16
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND STUDENTS' DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees in
part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 1
159 See Sara Sklaroff, Drug Use Among High Schoolers Up After Period of Decline, 3 EDUC.
WEEK, Feb. 9, 1994, at 8.
160 LAWRENCE F. Rossow & JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON
LEGAL PROBLEM OF EDUCATION, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 47-51 (2d ed.
1995).
161 id.
'1 Jessica Portner, Cops on Campus, 13 EDUC. WEEK 26-30, June 22, 1994 (noting that in
late 1970's there were fewer than 100 school police officers in this country).
"6 See Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (demonstrating situation
where university officials were cooperating with police in search of student dormitory for
narcotics), aff'd, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971), see also J.M. Sanchez. Expelling the Fourth
Amendment from American Schools: Students'Rights Six Years After T.L.O.. 21 J.L. & EDUC.
381, 399 (1992) (discussing standards for police).
64 See, e.g.. People in Interest of P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988) (requiring reasonable
suspicion for search by school official when police provided tip and school security guard assisted
in search); F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (requiring probable cause
for police-instigated search by school resource officer working in school, but paid by local
sheriff's office); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (concluding that
school officials had probable cause when they searched student's book bag in his locker and found
marijuana which was turned over to police and resulted in criminal charges). The roles of the
police and school officials with respect to the search often determine which standard to use. See,
e.g., Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 192 (8th Cir.) (applying reasonableness standard when
school official worked with, but not at behest of, police), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 930 (1987).
165 U.S. CONS'r. amend. XIV, § 2.
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A. Students' Due Process Rights
Goss v. Lopez'66 is the most significant court decision outlining the
due process rights of students in public schools. 67 In Goss, nine students
were suspended from a public high school for up to ten days without a
hearing for misconduct resulting from a demonstration in the school
cafeteria. These disturbances were part of widespread student unrest in the
school system during February and March of 1971.16s
Six of the nine students were suspended for "disruptive or disobedi-
ent" conduct that had occurred in the presence of the school principal who
ordered the suspension. One of the students was suspended when he
refused to leave after the school principal ordered him out. Another
student physically attacked the police officer who was attempting to remove
the first student. The remaining four students who were suspended had
engaged in "similar conduct." 69 None of these students was afforded a
hearing to determine the facts, but each was given an opportunity to attend
a meeting after the suspension along with his or her parents "to discuss the
student's future."7"
Of the nine students, three others were also suspended. One offered
no testimony. A second was a junior high school student involved in a
demonstration in a school other than the one she was attending. This
student was arrested and taken to police headquarters but was not charged.
A third student, one of the named plaintiffs in this case, was Dwight Lopez
who was suspended in connection with a disturbance in his school's
lunchroom in which school property was damaged. 7' Lopez, along with
these other two students, also was denied a hearing. A three-judge panel
ruled in favor of the students and the school district appealed.'72
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision
noting that students "do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the
' 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
167 See, e.g., Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Expulsion, Dismissal, Suspension, or Other
Discipline of Student of Public School, College, or University as Violating Due Process Clause
of Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment-Supreme Court Cases. 88 L. Ed. 2d 1015
(1986); E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Right of Student to Hearing on Charges Before Suspension
or Expulsion from Educational Institution. 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958 & Supp. 1994).
16s Goss, 419 U.S. at 569.
169 Id. at 569-70.
17o Id. at 570.
SId. at 570-71. Lopez testified that he was one of some seventy-five students suspended
that day, that he was merely an "innocent bystander," and that he had not been involved in the
destruction of the property. Id. at 570.
'- Goss. 419 U.S. at 572.
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schoolhouse door." 73 The Court also stated that a ten day suspension
from school is not de minimis but rather represents a substantial deprivation
of the students' property interest in educational benefits as well as a liberty
interest in reputation, 74 thus, violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 75
The Goss Court determined that at the very least, students should be
afforded "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing."' 7 6 Students
should have an opportunity to be heard so that they are not mistakenly
deprived of their constitutional rights.'" The Court noted that such
mistakes can easily happen in the school context.'78 Even though they
may be acting in good faith, disciplinarians must rely on the advice of
others to uncover misconduct. 179 The Court concluded that:
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or
less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against
him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story."
The Court also noted that there need not be any delay between the
time when notice is given and the time of the hearing. In addition, the
hearing may be informal as long as the school provides the student with a
chance to explain his or her side.' 8 ' The Court limited the holding to
shorter suspensions, but conceded that longer suspensions or expulsions
might require "more formal procedures.""' z
A month after Goss, the Supreme Court faced a similar situation in
Wood v. Strickland.I83 In this case, the Court addressed the issue of
whether certain students' expulsion from school infringed upon their due
process rights. In Wod, three sixteen-year-old female students were
expelled from an Arkansas high school for violating a school regulation
173 Id., at 574 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist.. 393 U.S. 503. 506
(1969)).
"I' The court stated that compulsory public education creates a property interest requiring due
process protections. Id. at 573-77.
'. Id. at 576.
176 Id. at 579.
177 Goss, 419 U.S. at 579-81.
178 -The risk of error [in the disciplinary context] is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded
against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process.-
Id. at 580.
179 Id.
110 Id. at 581.
"I Goss, 419 U.S. at 582. The type of notice and hearing required depends on the competing
interests which must be appropriately accommodated. Id. at 579.
182 Id. at 584.
183 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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which forbade the use or possession of alcohol or other intoxicating
beverages at school or during school-sponsored activities.,'
The students in question were charged with "spiking" the punch at the
meeting of an extracurricular organization.'" The girls crossed state
lines to purchase liquor because their school was located in a "dry" county.
They bought six ten-ounce bottles of a soft drink with which they mixed
two twelve-ounce bottles of malt liquor. The punch was then served, with
no apparent ill effects, at a school-sponsored meeting of both students and
parents. 116
Ten days later, the teacher who sponsored the activity heard a rumor
about the "spiking" and asked the girls about it. The teacher advised the
girls to admit their prank to the principal so that she could help them
before the matter became "distorted. "' The girls then went to the
principal and confessed their involvement.'88
The principal, Mr. Waller, suspended the three girls from school for
a maximum of two weeks pending the decision of the school board, which
would be meeting that evening.'89 He told the students that they could
tell their parents about the meeting but that the parents should not contact
any of the board members. At the board meeting, both the principal and
the teacher involved recommended leniency. This recommendation was
withdrawn when the superintendent called to report that one of the three
girls, without mentioning which one, had been in a fight at a basketball
game that evening. The board voted to expel the girls from school for the
remainder of the semester, which was approximately three months. "9
Two weeks later, the board held a meeting with the girls, their
parents, and legal counsel who requested that the policy be changed.'9 '
Neither the teacher nor the principal attended this session. The board read
a written statement of the facts wherein the students had admitted to
"spiking" the punch. They voted not to change the policy and to keep the
three-month expulsion as previously decided.'9
When this case came before the United States Supreme Court, the
e Id. at 311.
I. ' Id.
196 Id.
187 Id. at 312.
11 Wood, 420 U.S. at 312.
189 Id.
19 Id.
"I, The girls requested that the board refrain from punishing their actions with such severity
as substantial suspension from school. Id. at 313. Ultimately, the board refused. Id.
"9 Wood, 420 U.S. at 313.
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students were asking for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19 The
Court, however, could not make a decision about damages under this
section because such a determination hinges upon whether there was a
constitutional violation."9  Neither the district court nor the court of
appeals had made this determination. Therefore, the Court vacated the
case, and remanded it to the court of appeals leaving Goss as the most
important Supreme Court decision to focus on students' due process
rights.' 95
B. Limitations on Students' Due Process Rights
Goss v. Lopez acknowledged that students have due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment but limited such rights to notice and a
hearing the type and formality of which depended upon the particular
situation." The Goss Court implied that students might have greater
rights if suspended or expelled for longer than ten days. ' 7 In this
regard, Justice White, speaking for the majority, noted:
We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves solely to
the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or
expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may
require more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that
in unusual situations, although involving only a short suspension,
something more than rudimentary procedures will be required."'8
As indicated by the outcome in 4bod v. Strickland, however, these issues
remain to be decided at the Supreme Court level. '
C. Diminution of Students' Due Process Rights
Even the rather minimal standard of notice and a right to be heard
established in Goss may be diminished under certain circumstances. As
the Goss Court noted:
We agree with the District Court, however, that there are recurring
situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon.
19' Id. at 310. The school board asserted immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. at 314.
' Id. at 327.
19I d. at 322, 327.
'9 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
197 Id.
'98 Id.
1') See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (remanded to determine due process issue).
On remand, the Eighth Circuit in Strickland v. Inlow. 519 F.2d 744. 746-47 (8th Cir. 1975).
declared that the students' due process rights under Goss had been violated.
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Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property
or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immedi-
ately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and
rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable. .... 200
The Court also seemed reluctant to impose procedures on school
disciplinarians, and went so far as to state that what they have required is
actually "less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon
himself to avoid unfair suspensions."2"'
Students' Fourteenth Amendment rights were further diminished in the
Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wight.2°2 This decision dealt
with two issues. First, the Court considered whether the Eighth Amend-
ment, which protects citizens against "cruel and unusual punishment,"
extends to corporal punishment (paddling) of students in schools. 3
Secondly, it looked at whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause requires notice and a right to be heard in these situations.2'
In answering the first question, the Court looked to the history of the
Eighth Amendment and found that it was intended to protect those
convicted of crimes' and thus, should not be extended to the paddling
of students as a disciplinary measure. 6  In determining that corporal
punishment in public schools involves a liberty interest protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment,' the Court emphasized the nature rather than
the weight of the interests at stake.2 8
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that there is a long
history of allowing paddling as punishment for school children. 9 While
students should be afforded some procedural safeguards to ensure that they
,o Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-83.
201 Id. at 583.
201 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
,_o Id. at 653.
204 Id.
I Id. at 664-66. The Eighth Amendment was derived from England's Bill of Rights which
was concerned with how judges enforced criminal laws. Id.; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169-73 (1976).
1 Ingraham. 430 U.S. at 664; see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 n.4 (1985)
(citing Ingraham).
207 Ingraham, at 672-74 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)).
Id. at 672 (delineating test for determining whether due process requirements apply). The
Court noted that an individual's liberty interest has been interpreted to include "freedom from
bodily restraint and punishment." Id. at 674. Thus, the Court concluded that "lilt is fundamental
that the state cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance with due
process of law." Id.
3 Id. at 674-76.
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are not punished unfairly, there is common law-both civil and crimi-
nal-which protects students against both excessive and unjustified corporal
punishment."' In instances where the state has preserved what "has
always been the law of the land," the need for administrative safeguards is
much less compelling."'
III. THE CONDITION OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS 25 YEARS AFTER TINKER
It is unfortunate that we have reached the point where so many of our
great public institutions resemble medieval fortresses .... This sight is
a sobering reminder of the price we pay for security. But to envision
students and teachers ... huddled in fear as they attempt to go about
their daily work is a far worse image.-
If one walked into a public school. today, it is conceivable that guards
would be at the door, students and visitors would be required to be
searched with metal detectors before entering, police would be involved
frequently in discipline problems, dogs would be present to sniff for drugs,
lockers would be searched routinely, luggage would be searched prior to
field trips, drug testing programs would be in place, and students might be
physically punished for alleged wrong doings with no opportunity to
explain. Students might also be subjected to very intrusive search-
es-sometimes even total nude searches. 213 All of these types of searches
and disciplinary actions, at least in some jurisdictions, have been up-
held-always in the name of order and often in the name of safety.
While this composite may present an exaggerated view of schools, the
fact remains that we have long held the belief, and rightfully so, that
students must feel safe if they are to learn. On the other hand, part of this
learning includes a knowledge of our constitutional rights and what better
way is there to teach such rights than to model them? Consequently, the
210 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 474-76: see, e.g., Suits v. Glover. 71 So. 2d 49. 50 (Ala. 1954)
(reasoning that teacher could be guilty of assault and battery if punishment was inflicted with
malice, or resulted in permanent injury); Martinez v. School Dist. No. 60, 852 P.2d 1275. 1279
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that student must be apprised of school regulations before being
disciplined); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 1987) (limiting teachers' use of
physical force to that reasonably necessary to maintain discipline).
211 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679 (citing United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964)).
2'2 People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) ("Without first
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.)"
213 Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993):
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of similar scenarios, see
Robert Berkley Harper, School Searches-A Look into the 21st Century. 13 Miss. C.L. REV. 293
(1993) and Stuart C. Berman, Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the
T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
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public as well as educators alike have been ambivalent about issues of
safety and students' rights. And this ambivalence has spread to the
judiciary. It is reflected in lower court opinions,214 like Schaill and
Acton, where circuits could not agree upon a standard to be used for
student drug testing. It is shown in Justice Ginzberg's concurring opinion
in Acton where she interprets the majority's opinion as applying only to the
drug testing of student atheletes.215 It is demonstrated by the plurality
vote in landmark cases such as Goss, and by the numerous accompanying
opinions in decisions such as T.L. .216 It has further been noted by
scholars217 as well as the popular press. 21
8
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion
in the T.L. 0. case, Ellen Goodman, a columnist for the Boston Globe,
speculated that this decision would "make little difference in the every day
running of the schools. ,,219 Ms. Goodman observed:
Many schools already operate like communities built on mutual respect,
others have the atmosphere of a 19th century workhouse .... [I]t should
be noted that the Supreme Court didn't make a decision in the literal
sense of that word. The Supreme Court hasn't resolved our conflicts
about safety and privacy or about the relationship of students to the
schools. It has merely reflected and perhaps heightened our ambivalence.2
This ambivalence about safety, privacy, and students' relationships to
the schools is also illustrated by the different ways in which the justices
approached the school search dilemma. For instance, Justice Powell, in his
concurring opinion in T.L. 0. noted that because of "the special characteris-
214 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.. 690 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that dog sniffs of cars and lockers are not searches within the meaning of Fourth Amend-
ment, but requiring individualized reasonable suspicion for dogs to sniff children's' person). cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53 (upholding administrative search
utilizing metal detectors at entrance of school): Desilets v. Clearview Regional Bd. of Educ.. 627
A.2d 667, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (weighing intrusion of searching students'
luggage against school interest in protecting students and finding search constitutionally valid).
But see Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (holding
unconstitutional use of dog to indiscriminately search students' cars and persons).
21jS Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386. 2397 (1995). Justice Ginsberg stated:
"I comprehend the Court's opinion as reserving the question whether the District, on no more
than the showing made here. constitutionally could impose routine drug testing not only on those
seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all students required to attend school." Id.
216 In addition to Justice White's majority opinion. Justices Powell and Blackmun each wrote
separate concurring opinions and Justices Brennan and Stevens each wrote opinions concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
217 See, e.g., MARK YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (1992).
218 Ellen Goodman, Ambivalent About Searches, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22. 1985. at 15.
219 Id.
=o Id.
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tics" of elementary and secondary schools, students should have a lesser
expectation of privacy than other members of the population.', On the
other hand, as Justices Powell and O'Connor observed, school officials
often possess an attitude of "personal responsibility for the student's
welfare as well as for his education."' And as Justice Stevens observed
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of
arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel
that they have been dealt with unfairly.223
One reason for this judicial ambivalence is the Court's reluctance to
interfere in the day to day workings of the school, i.e., to become a "super
censor of [the] school board."22' 4 Another reason is the understanding
that education is a state or local issue rather than a federal issue and that,
whenever possible, educational issues should be left up to the states and to
the local school districts.'2
The problem with such approaches, as illustrated in the context of this
paper, is that the reluctance on the part of the courts to decide these issues,
accompanied by inaction on the part of some states, results in the need for
a great deal of discretionary judgment at the local levels. 1 6  School
officials, even the majority of those acting in good faith, are likely to find
themselves in a quandary as to what the law requires in such a myriad of
circumstances. This situation is a far cry from what the T.L. 0. Court must
have anticipated when they instituted the reasonable suspicion standard in
an effort to "spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause. "227
In addition, the extraordinary amount of discretionary enforcement
coupled with little authoritative guidance as to actual legal issues, may lead
to enhanced students' rights or to a diminution of those rights. As the law
21 New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325. 350 (1985) (Powell, J.. concurring) ("Without first
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.").
2-2 Id.
- Id. at 373-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico. 457 U.S.
853. 885 (1982).
1 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (recognizing need for school officials to have freedom to
maintain order); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1974) (calling education -perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments"), Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886
(6th Cir. 1991) ("Like police officers, school officials need discretionary authority to function
with great efficiency and speed in certain situations . . ").
I See supra notes 123-32, 184-200 and accompanying text.
27 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
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stands now, the extent to which students may exercise their rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments could well depend upon the jurisdic-
tion, state, or perhaps even the school system in which the student resides.
Indeed, both the Goss and the T.L. 0. Courts mentioned that the states may
create laws which give students additional protection.
2 8
For example, students facing long term suspensions and expulsions
may be afforded Goss's minimal guarantees of notice and the right to be
heard, or if they are fortunate enough to live in the right place, they may
be allowed opportunities to inspect evidence, present and cross-examine
witnesses, and be assisted by legal counsel. 9 Differences in these rights
take on added meaning if the nature of the infraction is a criminal act
which must be reported to the police, or if the consequences require that
the student be tried as an adult. Although some states have outlawed
corporal punishment of students, in other states students may be subjected
to this type of punishment-often without due process-and sometimes even
at the objection of their parents 30
With respect to Fourth Amendment protections, consider the issue of
strip searching. If a student lives in California, Iowa, Oklahoma,
Washington, or Wisconsin, he or she cannot be strip searched by school
officials, it is illegal131 Furthermore, in Wisconsin it is a criminal
offense. 2  On the other hand, if a student does not live in one of these
states, but resides in the Sixth or Seventh Circuit, under the Williams"-3
and Cornfield' decisions, the school could legally strip search the
student without a warrant and without probable cause if the search was
"reasonable." There are similar, but less dramatic, inconsistencies
regarding luggage searches and canine sniffing. 5  In drug testing of
student athletes, the difference of opinion at the federal appeals court level
was of such concern that the United States Supreme Court decided to
I See Goss, 419 U.S. at 578-79 (noting that courts should flexibly interpret Due Process
Clause, but that Fourteenth Amendment requires, at a minimum, some kind of notice and some
kind of hearing); T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 343 n.10.
219 ROBERT J. SHOOP AND DENNIS R. DUNKLEE, SCHOOL LAW FOR THE PRINCIPAL 167
(1992).
3 Twenty states have banned corporal punishment outright. See IRWIN A. HYMAN.
READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK 228 (1990).
231 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (West 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808A.2 (West 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 24-102 (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.230 (3) (1991);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.32 (West 1991).
-'- See Wis. STAT. ANN. §118.32 (West 1991).
1-3 Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
234 Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993).
" See supra note 214 (discussing cases that demonstrate inconsistencies).
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intercede.
A cogent reason often used to justify the diminution of students' rights
is safety. A legal basis for this action was foreshadowed in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in T.L.0., where he made the observation
that in light of the increasingly common use of drugs among students and
possession of weapons, "an immediate response frequently is required not
just to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to protect the
very safety of students and school personnel." 1' 6 The problem with
Blackmun's observation, and with the lower court cases that have followed
it, is that drug possession and weapon possession have been lumped
together as if they present the very same danger. If one closely considers
the cases mentioned in this paper, however, it is clear that these two issues
present very different legal problems. Weapons are much more likely to
pose an immediate danger and may be detected through fairly unintrusive
searches. On the other hand, while possession of drugs may ultimately
cause as much harm as weapons, this danger is insidious, less immediate,
and the methods of searching for drugs are frequently more intrusive.
Thus, perhaps the most important legal questions related to safety
issues are: How immediate is the danger and how much does the govern-
ment action infringe upon the rights of students? Taken this way, actions
such as metal detector searches are much more likely to pass constitutional
muster than highly intrusive (strip) searches for drugs. Even though under
some circumstances both types of searches are legal, there still remains
perhaps more important questions of practice and policy such as: Do these
practices work? And, perhaps more importantly, what is the effect of such
actions on school climate?
This paper began with, an analogy about war. And while it discussed
the purpose of the war on drugs and violence, it failed to mention the
enemy. Who is the enemy? One might contend that there are enemies on
the outside; people coming into our schools to cause disruption. This is
why many of our schools use metal detectors, employ security guards, and
regularly call in the police. On the other hand, approaches such as
corporal punishment and widespread and intrusive searches are more often
aimed at students; those on the inside. Under this model, the enemies are
our students.
This adversarial portrayal of schools is not one with which the
courts have necessarily agreed. On the contrary, as Justice Powell noted
in his concurring opinion in T.L. 0.:
26 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352-53 (1985) (Blackmun. J.. concurring).
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The special relationship between teacher and student ... distinguishes the
setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers
function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the
responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those
who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such
persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist
between school authorities and pupils. 237
In the last twenty-five years, schools may have become more
impersonal as they have grown larger through consolidation or population
booms."3 In addition, with the demise of the in loco parentis doctrine
and increased police involvement, school authorities may well be more like
law enforcement officers than like parents. 9 At the same time, we have
a national crime bill and national educational goals, one of which is to
ensure safe schools. Moreover, we are currently engaged in a debate about
national educational standards, i.e., accountability.
Somewhere along the line, we seem to have lost sight of Tinker's
message that students have rights in schools. The T.L. 0. Court asked that
we balance students' rights against the obligations of administrators to
maintain a safe and orderly school climate, yet the dialogue, both at the
local and national level as well as in the new Acton decision, seems to
focus mostly on the authority side of these scales. The primary role of
schools is and always has been to educate, to inspire, to bring forth a
"marketplace of ideas," 2' and to teach our youth about democratic
ideals. If we forget this role by turning schools into fortresses or by
punishing the many for the wrong-doings of a few, then perhaps we have
met the enemy. Perhaps we are the enemy.
11 1d. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring).
238 Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1671-72 (1986).
.39 Id.
21 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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